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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court erred in its perception of the adjudicative 
facts as to why Corwin was legally innocent of a felony. 
In his opening brief, Corwin defined his cause of action on 
post-conviction as an issue of how criminal evidence with a statute 
of limitations that has expired, cannot be admitted in a subsequent 
DUI criminal proceeding, as it violates substantial rights. Then 
how the court erred in concluding that Corwin's claim was the same 
as in State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133, 206 P.3d 497 (Ct.App.2009). 
Entwined with that argument in contrast to Lamb, Corwin argued 
that the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments, 
makes it appropriate to assign to the state the same bar a defendant 
has if he attempts to use a recidivism hearing to challenge contract-
ual findings of guilt. See "R", p.4, L. 17. 
On appeal the Respondent in response argues that Corwin on 
appeal was claiming the District Court misinterpreted his argument 
by asserting that the statute's amendment violated the ex post 
facto clause, not the contracts clause. (Respondent's brief, p. 7) 
The Respondent, just as the District Court, are ignoring the claim 
raised by Corwin. Their argument is an evasive and disingenous 
tactic that should be excluded from consideration, as they do not 
wish to dispute the question on appeal. 
Corwin has not made a claim that he is being punished for 
DUis he committed in 1997 and 1998. (Respondent's argument, p. 7) 
Corwin is and has always claimed that the state was barred by a 
statute of limitations set by the 1998 DUI statute and I.C. § 73-106 
from using expired evidence. The question was posed as follows: 
- 1 -
B. Is the use of expired criminal evidence by unreasonable 
application of a legislative act, reprehensible and ob-
jectionable to the interest of finality of constitu-
tional conclusions of guilty pleas, the substantive due 
process doctrine, and the ex post facto clause? 
Corwin herein corrects that question to exclude the ex post 
facto clause. The averments raised by petition for post-conviction 
related to an assertion that legal evidence that has a statute of 
limitations, where the period of time has expired, is inadmissible 
as evidence to enhance a misdemeanor charge to a felony. On appeal 
the crux of the queston relates to the same cause. 
C. The Evidence At Issue. 
In 1998 Corwin in two separate occasions was convicted of 
misdemeanor DUis. He accepted plea bargains in both cases, and 
voluntarily pled guilty knowing that I.C. § 18-8005 defined, created, 
and regulated his conduct as a violator of the DUI statute. The 
statute's intent to deter Corwin from committing another DUI as 
paraphrased here, described that if Corwin was found guilty of a 
subsequent violation within five years, those two convictions would 
be admitted as legal evidence at a recidivism hearing to enhance 
that conviction to a felony. The code further mandated the court 
give notice of the penalties that would be imposed. From this 
law two misdemeanor DUI convictions became legal evidence with an 
expiration date of five years. 
From I.C. § 18-8005, one can only presume the legislature 
intended an expiration date on their sentencing objective. Therefore 
those two convictions in this case became "null" as legal evidence 
to any subsequent recidivism hearing after 2003. The significance 
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of that fact is that pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.) 
Rule 103(a), it was error to admit "null" evidence, and it further 
effected substantial rights of a party. A rule or law going towards 
this end does not go to the general issue of guilt, nor whether as 
a matter of law a conviction may be sustained. Corwin claims that 
the error he claims occurred affected the final judgments of two 
plea bargained convictions, the substantive due process doctrine, 
I.e.§ 73-101, I.e.§ 73-106, and I.R.E., rule 103(a). 
Trial counsel preserved this issue for appeal; but he as well 
as appellate counsel were ineffective in their representation of 
this claim. Appellate counsel and post-conviction counsel 
both abdicated this claim, while trial counsel presented an inapt 
argument and adverse cases. 
Corwin contends that application of the 2006 amendment to 
I.e.§ 18-8005, cannot encompass retroactively,legal evidence that 
was "null." Such an act infringes on the finality interest of 
judgments of guilty pleas. More, it offends the substantive due 
process doctrine, I.e.§§ 73-101 and 73-106, which protect indivi-
duals by preventing governments from creating or applying statutes 
that are "manifestly unjust and oppressive" in their retroactive 
effect. 
D. The Finality Of Judgments And Guilty Pleas. 
Corwin asserts the presumption of regularity that attaches 
to final judgments makes it appropriate to assign to the State 
the same bar a defendant has if he attempts to use a recidivism 
hearing to challenge contractual findings of guilt. 
The United States supreme Court and the Idaho Courts have 
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held that a defendant has no right to collaterally attack the 
constitutional validity of prior DUI convictions used to support 
a charge of felony DUI. See State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 
P.3d 497 (Ct.App.2004). In this case Corwin contends the State 
should not have been allowed to use Corwin's two prior convictions. 
That conduct infringed on conclusive decisions of constitutional 
rihts. Just as Corwin has no right to challenge the validity of 
his two guilty pleas, because they are final, the State also has 
not acquired a right to permeate the finality of those judgments 
by application of the 2006 amended DUI statute. It is unjust to 
allow one party to penetrate constitutional conclusions, and deny 
the other a claim that this new law compromises the validity of 
two voluntary guilty pleas. 
Corwin therefore asserts the same considerations the United 
States Supreme Court highlighted in Custis v. United State~, 511 
U.S. 485 (1994), in limiting collateral attacks on guilty pleas 
should apply. 
"The interest in promoting the finality of judgments 
provides additional support for ourconstitutional 
conclusion. As we have explained, 11 [ i]nroads on the 
concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in 
the integrity of our procedures" and inevitably delay 
and impair the orderly administration of justice. 
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, n.11, 
99 s.ct. 2235, 2240, n.11, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979). we 
later noted in Parke v, Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 s.ct. 517, 
517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), that principles of final-
ity associated with habeas corpus actions apply with at 
least equal force when a defendant seeks to attack a 
previous conviction used for sentencing. By challeng-
ing the previous conviction, the defendant is asking a 
district court "to deprive [the] [state-court] judg-
ment of [its] normal force and effect in a proceeding 
that ha[s] an independent purpose other than to over-
turn the prior judgmen[t]." Id. at 30, 113 s.ct., at 
523. These principles bear extra weight in cases in 
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which the prior conviction, such as one challenged by 
Custis, are based on guilty pleas, because when a guilty 
plea is at issue, "the concern with finality served by 
the limitation on collateral attack has special force." 
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 s.ct. 
2085, 2087, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979)(footnote omitted)." 
In regard to promoting the finality of judgments, I.C. § 73-106 
directs as follows: 
"No action or proceeding commenced before the compiled 
laws take effect, and no right accrued, is effected by 
their provisions, but the proceeding therein must con-
form to the requirements of the compiled laws as far 
as applicable." 
A plea that is entered with a full understanding of what the 
plea connotes and its consequences is a valid plea. E.g. Ray v. 
State, 133 Idaho 96, 99 (1999); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
89 s.ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). 
Corwin thus contends the integrity of such judgments can't 
be compromised by retroactive application of the 2006 amended 
DUI statute. The State did not acquire a right to permeate the 
finality of Corwin's two prior judgments by this change in the 
law. The United States Supreme Court and Idaho Courts have adopted 
the interest finality serves on limiting defendants from attacking 
guilty pleas through collateral proceedings. Why not legal evidence 
that emerge from guilty pleas, which further had a statute of 
limitations and that had expired? 
E. The Substantive Due Process Connection. 
Corwin acknowledges that "null" evidence that is admitted 
pursuant to new law, does not fall within the categorical descrip-
tions of ex post fact laws; but such an act is retrospective law 
that violates substantial rights. 
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Corwin thus argues that erroneous admission of legal evidence, 
which were elements needed to enhance a misdemeanor charge to a 
felony violated substantial rights. Corwin declares he had a 
right to equal protection of fundamental rights. Corwin contends 
that where a statute of limitations exist on legal evidence, that 
component has to be considered in the inquiry. 
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly 
upheld recidivism statutes "against contentions that they violate 
constitutional strictures dealing with double jeopardy, ex post 
facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal protec-
tion, and privileges and immunities," Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 
27, 113 s.ct. 517, 522, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), does not mean that 
law is static. Circumstances of a case can have a valid interest 
in those decisions. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 s.ct. 
3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)(life sentence without parole imposed 
under recidivism statute violated Eighth Amendment when current 
conviction was for passing a bad check and prior offenses were 
similarly minor.) 
In this case the two contractual findings of guilt involved, 
became legal evidence, competent and material to a subsequent 
recidivist DUI hearing. That fact was the final component of 
the consequences for driving under the influence. Those two con-
victions would exist for five years as competent legal evidence. 
In 2003 the five years came and went. The legal consequences 
of those two DUis changed and became "null," expunged by statutory 
law, and no longer admissible evidence to any subsequent violation 
of the DUI statute. 
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There are substantial rights effected by admission of "null" 
evidence at a recidivist hearing, other than the rights involved 
in the interest of promoting finality of judgment issues. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that "null" evidence is inadmissible 
to enhance a charge. See State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139 (1971 ). 
Corwin asserts one has to acknowledge that it is the effect, not 
the form of the law that determines whether it violates substantial 
rights. In this case the amended statute cannot be retroactively 
applied to "null" legal evidence that was expunged by statute 
in 2003, long before the change occurred. 
Corwin contends that retroactive application of the new law, 
took away and impaired rights acquired under the 1998 DUI statute 
and created a new obligation. See Qhlinger v. United States, 
135 F.Supp. 40 (D.Idaho1955)(The court defined "a retroactive, law, 
in the legal sense, is one that takes away or impairs vested rights 
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes 
a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions 
or considerations already past.") See also I.C. §§ 73-101 and 
73-106. 
In this case to resurrect "null" legal evidence after the 
relevant statute of limitations had expired, is to eliminate a 
conclusive presumption forbidding admissibilty of this evidence, 
to aggravate a crime on a quantum of evidence where that quantum, 
at quantum, at the time the new law was enacted, was legally inad-
missible. This error authorized a court to receive evidence which 
a court would not previously accepted as proof to enhance a charge. 
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Corwin asserts that the Eighth Amendment, substantive due 
process, I.e.§§ 73-101 and 73-106 protected him form cruel and 
unusual punishment, caused by an unfair judicial proceeding, by 
preventing the state from applying enacted laws with manifestly 
unjust and oppressive retroactive effects. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case judgment of constitutional conclusions were 
at rest and final. It is undisputed Corwin performed as mandated 
by law and plea agreements. The state and Corwin both received 
the benefits of their bargain, and the legislature received its 
five years deterrence of its sentencing objective. It would there-
fore be unjust to allow one party to permeate what were valid 
guilty pleas under the constitutions. 
Further, the substantive due process doctrine, the Eighth 
Amendment, I.e.§§ 73-101 and 73-106, plus I.R.E., 103(b) prohibit 
admission of "null" evidence. The substantive due process doctrine 
requires the judiciary to apply a legislative act fairly. The 
essence of substantive due process is protection from unreasonable 
action. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 13th Reprint 1998. 
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